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Abstract
The idea that the support of local people is essential for the success of protected areas is widespread in conservation, 
underpinning various conservation paradigms and policies, yet it has rarely been critically examined. This paper 
explores the circumstances which determine whether or not local opposition to protected areas can cause them 
to fail. It focuses on the power relations between protected areas and local communities, and how easily they 
can inß uence one another. We present a case study from the Dominican Republic, where despite two decades of 
resentment with protected policies, local people are unable to signiÞ cantly challenge them because of fears of 
violence from guards, inability to reach important political arenas, social ties with guards, and the inability to 
coordinate action. It concludes by arguing that there are often substantial barriers that prevent local people from 
challenging unpopular conservation policies, and that local support is not necessarily essential for conservation.
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INTRODUCTION
Issues of the relationship between protected areas and 
local communities are of vital importance to biodiversity 
conservation. A better understanding of how they interact, 
inß uence, and shape one another allows us to improve our 
ability to conserve the areas biodiversity while maximising 
beneÞ ts, or at least minimising costs, to the populations 
living in and around protected areas, who are often amongst 
the most marginalised groups in society. This paper refers to 
one particular debate within this broad arena, the question 
of whether the support and consent of local populations are 
essential prerequisites for the success of protected areas, which 
Brockington (2004) refers to as the principle of local support. 
This notion states that if individual protected areas are to have 
any long term continuity as institutions, and if they are to be 
effective in preserving the biodiversity contained within them, 
then local people must support them. Discontented local people 
will resist protected area regulations, protest against them, refuse 
to cooperate with authorities and participate in their plans. This 
will consequently undermine both the institution of a protected 
area and the health of the biodiversity contained within it. The 
principle has an interesting position in conservation strategy, 
discourse, and practice. As Brockington (2004) notes, it is 
strongly expressed in keynote speeches and declarations at 
major conservation meetings. David Western (2001: 202), an 
inß uential conservationist and former director of the Kenya 
Wildlife Service argues that a fallacy of protectionism is that 
we can ignore the costs locally. The president of the IUCNs 
opening speech to the fourth World Parks Congress stated that 
quite simply, if local people do not support protected areas, 
then protected areas cannot last (Ramphal 1993: 56). Adrian 
Phillips argues that any approach that marginalises the local 
community in decision-making is doomed to failure, and 
that there is an iron rule that no protected area can succeed 
for long in the teeth of local opposition (Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2002quotes taken from Brockington 2004). It forms 
the basis of many strategies that aim to raise support for 
protected areas amongst local people as a path to conserving 
biodiversity, and is taken as a relatively unproblematic truth 
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in papers in conservation journals (e.g., Berkes 2004; Bulte 
and Rondeau 2005). It is implicit in the thinking of donors 
funding conservation and NGOs, and in the declarations 
emerging from the last World Parks Congress held in Durban 
in 2003 on what makes conservation successful and what 
strategies should be taken in the following decade. In particular, 
building support for protected areas from local communities 
and other constituencies was one of the seven themes of the 
Congress, not only out of recognition of the contribution that 
conservation can make to well-being and other reasons, but 
also because it is presumed that support makes conservation 
more effective. A considerable number of studies on the social 
relations of protected areas are primarily or solely designed 
to measure the attitudes of local people towards protected 
areas, with the implicit or explicit assumption that such 
attitudes have a crucial bearing on the success or otherwise of 
protected areas (e.g., Kideghesho et al. 2007, Triguero-Mas et 
al. 2009). Remarkably, given that they disagree on many other 
issues, it is accepted as true by advocates of community-based 
conservation as well as those supporting the fences and Þ nes 
approaches, even if they differ in how they think it should be 
achieved1 (e.g., Brandon et al. 1998).
While there have been studies exploring the relationship 
between protected areas and local people, this has not directly 
addressed the principle of local support, with the exception of 
Brockington (2002, 2003, 2004). The purpose of this paper is 
to critically analyse the principle, and in particular to move 
beyond Brockingtons contribution by considering what might 
make it true or false. It does this by considering what is known 
about the power relations and interactions between protected 
areas and local communities. It begins by demonstrating the 
logic behind the principle of local support, followed by an 
exploration of the factorsparticularly those that increase 
or decrease the ability of local people to inß uence protected 
area policywhich may make it true or false. The original 
contribution of this paper lies in this area. The arguments are 
then illustrated with a detailed study of the history of a protected 
area in the Dominican Republic, which shows not only how 
protected areas can survive discontent and opposition, but also 
the complex and surprising ways in which local people and 
protected areas can shape one anothers behaviour.
The principle of local support and conservation policy
The principle of local support assumes that local people 
who are dissatisÞ ed with conservation because of the costs 
and constraints it imposes on them will resist and this will 
cause conservation efforts to fail. Local people may become 
dissatisÞ ed with protected areas because they displace them 
from their homes, restrict their livelihoods by limiting access 
to natural resources, fail to deliver promised beneÞ ts, and other 
reasons (West and Brockington 2006). They may chose to resist 
these costs through formal political opposition such as legal 
challenges, lobbying, and protest marches (e.g., Sullivan 2003), 
but more frequently through more subtle, indirect protests such 
as non-cooperation and sabotage (Holmes 2007). In short, the 
principle argues that dissatisÞ ed local people have the power 
to make protected areas fail. Failure is rarely deÞ ned but is 
implied as an inability to protect biodiversity (particularly 
emblematic species) within a protected area, or the weakening 
or collapse of a protected area as an institution.
A well known and influential case of the principle in 
action comes from the Amboseli in Kenya. Here pastoralists 
unhappy with the constraints imposed on their livelihoods by 
conservation regulations took to attacking high-proÞ le wildlife 
such as lions and elephants, and cooperating with poachers, 
thus undermining conservation efforts as the populations of 
these species plummeted. When strategies were changed to 
ensure that locals received material beneÞ ts from the park 
in order to earn their support, the killings diminished, the 
pastoralists turned on the poachers, and wildlife recovered 
(Western 1994). There are a number of other, similar examples 
of opposition undermining protected areas in the literature, 
although not so spectacularly as in Amboseli (e.g., Roth 2004; 
Norgrove and Hulme 2006). Larger scale studies and reviews 
provide further evidence in support of the principle. Struhsaker 
et al. (2005) surveyed administrators and scientists associated 
with 16 protected areas in African forests; they found positive 
attitude towards the areas among neighbouring communities to 
be the strongest correlate of protected area success, although 
there was no signiÞ cant correlation between park success and 
presence of education and outreach programmes. However, 
Bruner et al. (2001), using a similar methodology in a study 
of 93 large, strict, tropical protected areas, found that local 
support did not correlate with protected area success, although 
there was a relationship between success and the existence of 
compensation schemes. It should be noted that both studies 
greatly rely on surveying park managers, which should not 
be considered an unbiased source of information. Mascia 
and Paillers (2011) review of protected area degazettement, 
downgrading, and downsizing show a number of case studies 
where local discontent and opposition has led to a legal 
weakening of protected areas. In addition to the well known 
case studies and reviews, the principle may have become so 
widely accepted because it appears so straightforward and 
compellingit appears natural that dissatisÞ ed people will 
resist, and consequently conserving the resources of protected 
areas in the face of opposition will be impossible (Brockington 
2004).
The principle has made an important contribution to a 
number of different policy positions on protected areas, each of 
which tend to take different approaches to ensure local support. 
It is particularly inß uential in the broad set of approaches 
known as community conservation, which often includes 
a strong element of devolving a proportion of the material 
beneÞ ts of protected areas to local communities in order to win 
their support, as a means of guaranteeing that conservation is 
successful (see cases discussed in Barrett et al.1999; Berkes 
2004; Hutton et al. 2005; Buscher and Whande 2007; Hausser 
et al. 2009). Such beneÞ t-sharing strategies use economic 
power to ensure local support, providing livelihood incentives 
for locals as a way of conserving biodiversity (Adams and 
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Hulme 2001; Brown 2002; Adams et al. 2004). Advocates 
of the fences and Þ nes approach argue that protected areas 
should ensure local support, not through allowing them use of 
natural resources (a key part of the fences and Þ nes approach 
is that local communities and protected areas should be 
spatially and economically separated), but through education 
programmes which inform local people of the beneÞ ts of 
protected areas (Brandon et al. 1998). Advocates of indigenous 
and community conserved areas argue that by encouraging a 
cultural connection between communities and protected areas, 
support can be maintained and successful conservation ensured 
(Berkes 2008). Even as these crudely differentiated paradigms 
have evolved, fed off one another, and seen their popularity 
wax and wane, the principle of local support has continued to 
contribute to policy.
Challenging the principle of local support
The literature emerging from anthropology, geography, and 
development studies in recent decades which examines in 
detail the politics of the relationships between protected areas 
and local people shows a more complex side to the principle 
of local support. In particular, they have looked at power, 
which is at the heart of the principle of local support. Power 
is an extremely complex issue which at its most basic is a 
measure of the ability of someone to do something, or to make 
someone else do something (Lukes 1974), such as the ability 
of conservationists to make local people behave in a particular 
way, or vice versa. The principle of local support implies that 
local people are powerful relative to protected areas, that they 
can make conservation fail should they dislike it, and that they 
can force a change in conservation policy.
Brockington (2004) challenges this by arguing that in fact 
local people are often much weaker than protected areas, that 
local people often cannot force a change in policy, and that 
conservation can thrive despite long term local opposition. 
His case study shows that while populations evicted from a 
reserve in Tanzania suffered considerable hardship as a result 
of protected area policy, and that resentment and opposition 
ensued, they simply lacked the ability to have a meaningful 
impact on the reserve, despite attempts at changing reserve 
policies, which included legal challenges. Protected areas have 
considerably more resources to draw on than local people when 
it comes to disagreements over regulation, making the views 
and actions of local people relatively unimportant for their 
success. It contrasts greatly with Westerns (1994) example, 
even though the two sites are less than 100 km apart, and have 
similar ecosystems. Similar cases where conservation has 
succeeded despite long term opposition have been noted by 
Neumann (1998), Walley (2004), and others. Indeed, the oldest 
modern protected areas which emerged in the USA in the late 
nineteenth century were subject to sustained opposition from 
disgruntled locals (Jacoby 2001), yet these parks remain today, 
as does some measure of local resentment (Stern 2008). Such 
cases demonstrate that protected areas often have considerably 
more resources to draw on than local people in disagreements 
over regulation, making the views and actions of local people 
relatively unimportant for their success. Brockington (2004) 
concludes by arguing that the principle attributes too much 
power to local people. Indeed, while conservationists often 
see themselves as relatively weak, struggling to protect 
biodiversity against powerful forces of demand for resources, 
population growth, corruption, and international trade in 
endangered species, they are still often much more powerful 
than local people (Brosius 2006).
What is missing between Brockington (2004) and Westerns 
(1994) accounts of the principle of local support is a sense of 
the circumstances under which local people may succeed or fail 
to shape protected area policywhat might make local people 
powerful or weak, relative to protected areas. The literature 
on the relations between protected areas and neighbouring 
communities illustrates some of these circumstances, which 
are explored below. It also illustrates three other important 
features. Firstly, there is a great variety of forms of power 
used in the relationships between local people and protected 
areas, a great number of ways in which they try to inß uence 
one anothers behaviour. Secondly, the relationship is not static 
or homogenousit is constantly changing with changing 
circumstances. Thirdly, just as local communities are not 
homogenous, there is no singular relationship between any one 
protected area and its neighbouring communities. Rather, there 
are multiple, coexisting relationships with different groups 
within these populations.
Perhaps the most important factor limiting local peoples 
ability to inß uence protected areas is that protected areas can 
utilise the legitimised violence of the state, and fear of this 
limits what actions local people are prepared to take. Protected 
area guards have the ability to Þ ne or imprison local people, 
they are often armed, and they can use violence to impose 
regulations. This formal power, shared with other agents of 
the state such as the police, is ampliÞ ed in many cases because 
of the informal way it is usedthe de facto way local people 
experience it is different and often more violent to the de jure 
way it is set out in statute. Stories of guards using summary 
violence towards local people are common (Norgrove and 
Hulme 2006; Robbins et al. 2007; Ogra 2008; Milgroom and 
Spierenburg 2008; Laudati 2010; Brondo and Bown 2011). 
Some countries have used a shoot-to-kill policy against 
suspected poachers in protected areas, even though poaching 
is not a capital offence. Neumann (2004: 831) has described 
resulting deaths as extra-judicial executions. The memory, 
fear, threat or expectation of violence from protected area 
guards can limit the actions which local people are prepared 
to take, and consequently their ability to inß uence protected 
area policy (Norgrove and Hulme 2006; Almudi and Berkes 
2010). Neumann (2004) argues that violence in conservation 
has been sustained because it is legitimised by certain dominant 
discourses about wildlife, poaching, and the extinction crisis. 
When local people can in turn use violence against protected 
area staff, this can be very effective in changing policy, 
although such high reward acts also involve high risk (Orlove 
2002; Norgrove and Hulme 2006).
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The second major factor is the move towards involving local 
people in protected areas, associated with the move towards 
community conservation, which has both opened up and 
closed down opportunities for locals to inß uence protected 
areas. Integrating local people gives them a means to inß uence 
protected areas, empowering them, particularly if they are 
granted management rights (Horowitz 1998; Berkes 2004; 
2008, Hausser et al. 2009). However, planned or claimed 
devolution and decentralisation of control of protected areas 
to local communities often does not occur in reality, as rent 
seeking opportunities drives state actors and local elites to 
centralise control and capture resources (Blaikie 2006; Nelson 
and Agrawal 2008; Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010). Where 
locals are granted control, they may lack the capacity to 
make the most out of it and to shape protected areas to their 
liking (Nelson and Agrawal 2008). Brown (2002) and Few 
(2001) illustrate cases where community involvement has 
been used by protected area authorities to limit local peoples 
inß uence on protected areas. Here participatory processes are 
carefully shaped, events stage-managed, and invitees carefully 
selected to exclude contrary viewpoints, so that the results 
meet the pre-set goals of the planners, giving the illusion of 
local participation yet producing the correct results. Even 
well-intended decentralisation projects can end up limiting 
the ability of some local people to inß uence protected area 
policyfor example, an individuals ability to inß uence a 
community or indigenous conservation project depends on 
whether or not they are classed as a member of that community 
or indigenous group, which is neither straightforward nor 
uncontroversial.
Other cases have demonstrated the importance of government 
structures and active civil society in allowing local people to 
inß uence protected areas. Beazley (2009) and Karanth (2007) 
illustrate cases in India where local people have been able to 
negotiate their own terms of relocation from protected areas, 
ultimately receiving a net beneÞ t from the process, because 
democratic structures and an active civil society campaigning 
for rural peoples rights forced local government to take their 
livelihoods and concerns seriously. Kepe et al. (2001) show 
how the political empowerment of black people at the end 
of apartheid allowed locals to successfully reclaim territory 
from a protected area in South Africa. Neumann (1995) 
demonstrates that the rise of civil society organisations opened 
up a space for pastoralist communities in Tanzania to use 
democratic and formal challenges against protected areas, 
which were previously absent. Yet government structures and 
civil society do not empower all local people equally. Kabra 
(2009) compares two cases of relocation in India, and shows 
that communities who tend to be less marginalised within 
society in general are able to get a better deal out of relocation 
because they have the knowledge, resources, connections, 
and experiences to be able to lobby the state and inß uence 
the outcome of the process. More marginalised groups lack 
this, and end up worse off. In other cases, the absence of 
frameworks to allow community or civil society involvement 
in protected area management gives local people a real sense 
of lacking power (Rutagarama and Martin 2006; Almudi 
and Berkes 2010; Torri 2011). Where legal structures allow 
formal challenges to protected areas, local people may lack 
knowledge or resources to take advantage of them (Almudi 
and Berkes 2010). They may also lack the ability to reach the 
arenas, in order to lobby, where decisions on protected areas 
are madeSachedina (2010) shows how the upscaling of 
conservation NGOs leads them to base themselves in large 
cities to pursue funding, with the consequence that they become 
metaphorically and physically distant from the rural areas in 
which they are supposed to work.
Other cases have highlighted the importance of having a 
monopoly on holding or producing knowledge. Changes in 
protected area policy, including in some cases the creation 
of protected areas, often come as a surprise to local people, 
limiting their ability to organise and challenge policy (Neumann 
1995). Adger et al. (2005) show how the refusal of protected 
area authorities to share information with locals is a barrier to 
local people being in a position to exert inß uence. Uncertainty 
over the location of the boundaries of protected areas meant 
that regulations were imposed in an ad hoc fashion, limiting 
local peoples ability to challenge them formally (Geisler et 
al. 1997). Local people can also exploit any uncertaintyin 
Geisler et al.s example, uncertain boundaries meant that 
landless families tried to get themselves classiÞ ed as living 
within the park to access anticipated compensation schemes. 
Norgrove and Hulme (2006) show how farmers whose 
land bordered a Ugandan protected area would deliberately 
move boundary markers to reclaim land from inside the 
park, although formalisation of the boundaries using GPS 
technology ended this. Related to knowledge, the ability to 
produce discourses and storylines about protected areas can 
open up or limit local peoples inß uence. If a discourse that 
a protected areas is an empty place, and always has been, 
becomes dominant, then local people struggle to assert their 
claims to rights and resources (Neumann 1995; Sletto 2002). 
Where certain conservation discourses are very dominant, local 
people may only be able to challenge protected areas using the 
language and ideas of the dominant discourse, which limits 
what arguments they can put forward (Buergin 2003). When 
local people can assert their own discourse, including things 
like local knowledge, place names, histories, and cultural 
links to the land, then this can be a powerful tool in changing 
protected area policy (Heatherington 2001; Kepe et al. 2001; 
Bryant 2002).
Social links between protected area staff and local people can 
be empowering for locals. Robbins et al. (2007) demonstrate 
that a sense of obligation among protected areas staff towards 
the livelihoods and well-being of local people meant that 
they were prepared to turn a blind eye to certain infractions. 
Norgrove and Hulme (2006) show that personal contacts 
allowed a level of bargaining between locals and protected 
area staff about what activities would be allowed. Interestingly, 
Stern (2008) found that local people who had social links to 
protected area staff were more likely to see protected areas 
as legitimate, to trust the staff, and to obey regulations. The 
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presence or absence of social links within local communities 
can also be important, as a lack of cohesion can limit the ability 
to organise and coordinate meaningful opposition (InÞ eld and 
Namara 2001; Kabra 2009).
The difÞ culties in mounting organised, formal opposition 
to protected areas, such as the fear of violence or the lack 
of knowledge or resources to pursue a legal route, can push 
local people into using weapons of the weak (Scott 1985) 
techniques such as sabotage, arson, slandering of guards, 
and non-cooperationwhich avoid direct confrontation, 
involve little planning or resources, and are often anonymous 
(Norgrove and Hulme 2006; Holmes 2007). This low risk 
approach is not aimed at challenging protected areas as 
institutions, but about changing de facto regulations so that 
local people work their everyday encounters of protected areas 
to their minimum disadvantage. Local communities use them 
against protected areas when more formal and more effective 
options are not available, and stop using them when better 
options arise (Neumann 1995; Norgrove and Hulme 2006). 
Such techniques can be very powerful, as in Westerns (1994) 
example of wildlife spearing in Amboseli. Here resistance was 
effective because it targeted highly visible ß agship species, 
such as lion and elephant, where attacks on wildlife could 
relatively easily lead to a noticeable decrease on their numbers, 
the preservation of which were a key conservation goal. 
Attacking high value, high proÞ le wildlife was a high impact 
form of resistance which carried few risks or costs, giving 
local people a trump card which could cause conservation to 
fail. Yet such powerful low risk options are rarely available, 
and the literature suggests that while such weapons of the 
weak can have some impact in limiting or delaying certain 
protected area policies, they are generally unable to seriously 
challenge the existence of protected areas or their ability to 
protect biodiversity (Neumann 1995; Norgrove and Hulme, 
2006; Holmes 2007; Kabra 2009).
What this literature demonstrates is that there are a great 
variety of factors which enable or prevent local people from 
shaping protected areas to their liking, which determines 
whether or not local opposition can cause protected areas to 
fail. These come from a broad range of sources, from national 
politics to protected area strategies to local social structures. 
The following sections outline a case from the Dominican 
Republic that demonstrates how changing political, social, 
economic, and cultural factors increased and decreased the 
ability of local people to inß uence protected area policy.
CASE STUDY: EBANO VERDE SCIENTIFIC 
RESERVE, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Dominican Republic is a good place to study the 
principle of local support. Despite being relatively highly 
densely populated, IUCN category I and II protected areas 
cover 21.5% of the country, the fourth highest percentage 
of any country in the world (Holmes 2010). During the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, protected areas were 
expanded with little consideration of rural people (Holmes 
2010) leading to resentment. Yet Dominican protected areas 
have been celebrated as a paragon for the rest of the global 
South to follow because they are seen by some as symbol 
of environmental foresights which stand in stark contrast to 
the interlinking ecological, social, economic, and political 
crises in Haiti, with which the Dominican Republic shares 
the island of Hispaniola (Diamond 2005)although it should 
be noted that Dominican conservation is not as widespread 
or effective as Diamond suggests (Holmes 2010). Although 
various authors agree that this growth was due to the drive 
of the dictatorial president Joaquin Balaguer, who ruled 
from 19661978 and 19861996, it remains unclear why 
he was so keen on creating protected areas (Diamond 2005; 
Holmes 2010). Protected areas in the Dominican Republic 
have tended to follow the fences and Þ nes approach with 
very little community involvement or outreach, and minimal 
long term planning. Regulations are often enforced in a de 
facto manner by the militarised forestry policy, while the 
involvement of international NGOs in Dominican conservation 
has been minimal (Geisler et al. 1997; Holmes 2010). This 
case study considers Ebano Verde ScientiÞ c Reserve, a 32 sq. 
km area located in the central highlands. It is based on largely 
qualitative Þ eldwork conducted between October 2006 and 
April 2007, examining the history of the relationship between 
the reserve and two neighbouring villages, El Arroyazo and La 
Sal. These villages were selected as they are the only villages 
located on the periphery of the reserve, their residents relied 
much more heavily on reserve resources than other villages 
in the region, and each contained a guard station and a public 
entry point to the reserve. Consequently, they were the two 
locations that were most affected by the reserves regulations 
and whose activities most affected the reserve. Data was 
collected from participant observation of everyday life and 
livelihood activities of one village, El Arroyazo, as well as 
a household survey of livelihood and land use history of all 
households in the village (n=58). Semi-structured interviews of 
46 men and 10 women who were identiÞ ed as key informants 
from the participant observation were undertaken, as well as 
2 participatory exercises in which 15 men were asked to rank 
the importance of various livelihood activities, land uses, and 
forest resources. There were also semi-structured interviews 
with 4 men and 5 women from a second village, La Sal. 
Multiple repeat semi-structured interviews of all 7 reserve 
guards, the reserve administrator, and the director of the NGO 
that administer the reserve, and observations of 2 participatory 
planning exercises set up by the reserve to allow local input 
into reserve strategy were undertaken. This data was then 
used to construct a history of the villages, its occupants, their 
livelihoods, and shifting relationships with the reserve.
The reserve is located in a tropical montane ecosystem at 
around 1000 m above msl. There is no evidence of any human 
habitation of the area until the two villages were settled in 
1950 by subsistence peasants searching for new lands (while 
the pre-Columbian Taino inhabitants of the island were 
known to have settled in neighbouring valleys, there are no 
archaeological traces in the area surrounding the valley, and 
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the Taino were extinct by 1550AD). The central mountains of 
the Dominican Republic were largely uncontrolled and very 
sparsely populated during the colonial era, but from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards they were colonised by peasants 
seeking new land, and occasionally by those seeking to escape 
government control (Moya Pons 1995; Turits 2003). The states 
reach only extended to the more remote areas of the central 
highlands during the early years of the dictatorial rule of Rafael 
Trujillo (19301961).
The area around the reserve was initially opened up by a 
dirt road constructed in 1950 to allow a small state-owned 
lumber mill, fed by lumber from a large piece of state-owned 
common access forest. Although the mill closed within 2 years, 
the settlers claimed land around this state forest as private 
property under colonists rights to terra nullius, and used 
shifting cultivation to grow root crops (manioc, sweet potato) 
for subsistence, both on the private land and (largely) within 
the commons, with occasional excess sold on the market. The 
forest was also used to corral animals. Timber was cut largely 
for subsistence, but also to sell to merchants, particularly pine 
(Pinus Occidentalis) and Ebano Verde (Magnolia Pallenscens), 
a prized hardwood. 
In the mid 1980s, concern grew amongst conservationists 
that Ebano Verde was critically endangered, due to its very 
limited habitat (it is endemic to just two sites in the central 
highlands), its growth and reproduction are slow, and because 
it was being cut down to meets demand from furniture makers 
in the lowlands. Dominican conservation has historically 
been dominated by a small elite who operate through social 
connections. Their major successes, particularly the creation 
of protected areas, have come through close connections to 
inß uential politicians, notably to the presidency during the 
highly centralised dictatorship of Joaquin Balaguer (1966
1978, 19861996) (Holmes 2010). Following this concern, the 
head of Balaguers forestry service met with the president of 
one Dominican conservation NGO, Fundación Progressio, to 
discuss how to protect the Ebano Verde and the montane cloud 
forest. This NGO is considered particularly well connected as 
its directors include bank directors, major industrialists, high 
court judges, national newspaper editors, and a Roman Catholic 
cardinal. Fundación Progressio drafted a proposal to turn the 
state forest into a scientiÞ c reserve, which the government 
accepted, creating the reserve in 1989. While the land of the 
reserve is state property, all responsibility for administering 
and Þ nancing the reserve was devolved from its inception to 
Fundación Progressio, giving them signiÞ cant autonomy. 
Such NGO involvement in protected area management is 
unique in the Dominican Republic, where the government is 
highly centralised, and it reß ects the close connections between 
the directors of Fundación Progressio and the Balaguer 
administration (Holmes 2010). Like many other Dominican 
protected areas, Ebano Verde ScientiÞ c Reserve operated 
without a formal management plan, and has emphasised strict 
protection and preventing any use of the forest resources, and 
had no community involvement until 2007. It is classiÞ ed as a 
category Ia protected area under the IUCN system, the strictest 
possible, which involves a minimum of human visitation.
By the time the reserve was declared, the populace of 
the area were concentrated in two villages of around 50 
households each located on the south and west side of the state 
owned forest (Figure 1). Upon the reserves legal creation, 
villagers were immediately told by the forestry police that 
they had one month to stop using the land and the resources 
inside the reserve. This measure severely constrained local 
peoples access to resources. In particular, it limited the land 
available for farming to small plots of privately owned land 
surrounding the villages. Household surveys indicate that 
92% of households farmed in the forest commons in 1989. 
At present, 43% of households in El Arroyazo own no land; 
the majority of these households depend on often precarious 
waged labour. A further 26% of households own less than 
0.4 ha. Almost all livestock were sold because there was no 
longer sufÞ cient land for grazing. Local peoples livelihoods 
were further limited by loss of access to wood for subsistence 
uses and for sale.
Although this exclusion from the forest sparked discontent, it 
did not lead to opposition, for three reasons. Most importantly, 
they were fearful of the notoriously violent militarised forestry 
police (for details of their violent history and peasants fear of it, 
see Rocheleau et al. 2001; Roth 2001). One villager described 
that he obeyed the order to leave the forest rather than resist 
because people would die [disobeying the forestry police]... 
it is better leave all you had than to die (old male subsistence 
farmer, El Arroyazo). Others recalled the notorious prison run 
by the forestry police where they torture you, it is worse than 
under [notoriously repressive president] Trujillo... you come 
out a different person (housewife, El Arroyazo). Peasants have 
historically ß ed or acquiesced to violent state regulation in the 
Dominican Republic (Turits 2003). Secondly, the reserves 
creation surprised villagers, who described how the reserve 
grabbed us by the throat (male ß ower cultivator, El Arroyazo). 
Decisions about the reserve all took place in meetings between 
bureaucrats and NGO staff in the capital; the villagers were not 
aware of the process let alone not having been consulted. They 
were Þ rst made aware of its creation when they were given 
a months notice to leave the forest, leaving them no time to 
coordinate resistancewe didnt know how to organise (male 
ß ower cultivator, El Arroyazo). Thirdly, villagers resentment 
was tempered slightly by promises by the reserve to compensate 
for livelihood losses through community outreach programmes 
Figure 1
Map showing the location of the 
Ebano Verde ScientiÞ c Reserve, Dominican Republic
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and employment. In the short term, these were sufficient 
barriers to prevent resentment turning into opposition that could 
undermine conservation.
Regulation initially focused on the village of La Sal as it 
had a disproportionate number of residents cutting Ebano. 
The reserve headquarters were located there; local men were 
recruited as guards, providing employment to substitute for lost 
access to forest resources. After a year, resentment increased 
as much of the promised compensation did not arrive, and 
regulations were tightened. In particular, the reserve authorities 
unilaterally declared an approximately 5 km deep buffer zone 
around the reserve, encompassing large amounts of privately 
held land around the villages. They began to regulate farming 
and livelihood practices within it despite buffer zones having 
no legal status in Dominican legislation. The director of 
Fundación Progressio described how the organisation played 
a little game with locals, telling them that the land in the buffer 
zone belonged to the reserve, so that the NGO could regulate 
these areas because they felt the forestry police were not 
protecting them enough. That they could impose regulations 
which had no legal basis shows the power of the reserve 
authorities in contrast to the peasantry.
Restrictions on using Þ re to clear stubble, cutting timber 
or gathering firewood severely affected livelihoods, yet 
these were not resisted in La Sal because of the pre-existing 
social relations between guards and villagers. Reserve guards 
were predominantly recruited from La Sal, as a tactic by 
the administering NGO to provide alternative livelihoods to 
woodcutting. In the context of a small, close-knit village, they 
were also friends, neighbours, and close relatives of those 
whose behaviour they were regulating. In these communities, 
cultural norms very strongly emphasised avoiding conß ict with 
fellow villagers. Good neighbourly relations and the resultant 
social capital were essential for accessing labour and resources 
in what was until the 1990s a largely non-monetary economy. 
Disputes are largely tolerated, or sometimes settled through an 
intermediary and thus avoiding direct confrontation between 
the parties. Conß ict would rupture the social ties between the 
two parties, with knock-on effects for friends and neighbours. 
In many cases, one of the disputants would end up leaving the 
community entirely. In the only dispute during my Þ eldwork 
that was not tolerated or resolved using intermediaries, two 
men in El Arroyazo came to blows and one ended up moving 
to Santo Domingo the next day. There were two cases in El 
Arroyazo where inherited property was disputed by siblings. 
In one, the party who felt they lost out tolerated the injustice, 
explaining that a challenge was not worth the social and 
economic consequences. In the other, an open dispute led 
to one man completely breaking ties with his family despite 
the serious subsequent hardships from losing farmland and 
opportunities for day labour. This well entrenched and widely 
acknowledged social norm means people go to great lengths 
to avoid conß ict with fellow villagers. Villagers explained 
that people want to avoid punches (male ß ower cultivator, 
El Arroyazo) because of the major consequences of arguments 
escalating.
As a result, the residents of La Sal chose to obey guards 
regulations rather than resistone guard explained People 
are more likely to listen if they know you and you tell them 
to stop doing something, people always listen to their friends 
(male guard, La Sal). Acquiescence to these regulations 
severely restricted the ability to pursue traditional livelihoods 
of cultivating root crops and beans, and access to valuable 
resources such as Þ rewood, and many chose to migrate to 
lowland cities, and the population declined steadingly. In 
1998, ß oods caused by Hurricane Georges swept away the 
bridge connecting the village to the outside world. The reserve 
refused to fund a replacement, but eventually a weak wire 
bridge was constructed, but this precarious link left the village 
unreachable by motorised transport. The loss of reliable access 
to markets and services accelerated population loss until the 
Þ nal inhabitants left in 2003. Former residents see the tight 
regulations and refusal to help with livelihoods and the bridge 
as a long term plan by the reserve to drive them outthey 
ended the village (female former resident of La Sal), they 
threw us out (female former resident of La Sal). In La Sal, 
social norms and social relations prevented resentment at 
conservation turning into resistance for over a decade. The 
reserve could be considered a success in the zone around La 
Sal: it has continued and even strengthened as an institution, 
its employees have an increased ability to patrol and enforce 
regulations in the area, and both former residents and guards 
note that the forest is beginning to recover from the effects 
of farming and logging in both the core reserve area and 
the buffer zone. These successes have come despite a lack 
of local support, but because local people were constrained 
from Þ ghting back and reshaping reserve policy because of 
memories of state violence, inability to organise, and the social 
links they had with reserve staff.
The case of El Arroyazo
A similar pattern of growing disenchantment with broken 
promises and tightened regulations, particularly the extension 
of regulations into activities on private property in the buffer 
zone, occurred in the other village, El Arroyazo. The reserve 
authorities began to concentrate more on this village as 
activities in La Sal came under control, relocating the reserve 
headquarters to El Arroyazo in 1995. Unlike at the moment of 
the reserves creation and in La Sal, resentment at tightened 
regulations was met with resistance, due to two key factors. 
Firstly, villagers realised after a few years that reserve guards 
were not the same as the forestry police, and hence they 
did not need to be feared in the same wayone described 
how initially they respected the uniform but that now 
things are different from the start (male wage labourer, El 
Arroyazo). Secondly, the cultural norms and social relations 
which restricted resistance in La Sal were no longer present 
in El Arroyazo because the guards were all strangers from a 
different village, with no social or family ties to residents of 
El Arroyazo. Tightened regulations were met with resistance. 
Villagers would not cooperate with the reserve, and refused 
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to denounce neighbours who broke the rules. Following new 
rules or contentious incidents, wildÞ res would be set on the 
periphery of the reserveone male ß ower cultivator who 
recalled setting such Þ res stated that this was out of revenge 
for reserve regulations, not necessarily out of any expectation 
of change. There would be Þ ghts between guards and villagers. 
One male ß ower cultivator, known for such Þ ghts, claimed he 
did this to stand up for fellow villagers against abusive guards 
who were messing in things [farming practices on private 
lands in the buffer zone] that were not theirs. Guards, who 
had to travel through the village to reach the reserve ofÞ ce 
from the main road, would speed through on motorbikes rather 
than walk because villagers would throw bottles and stones at 
them. This resistance led to an incident in 1998 where some 
brothers using Þ re to burn stubble on their plot were confronted 
by a guard. The farmers, who had been subject to a number of 
interventions by reserve authorities in previous years, angrily 
chased the guard with their machetes, nearly catching him. This 
incident, which could have been fatal, is widely recognised 
by villagers as changing reserve practices. The reserve 
authorities began to turn a blind eye to many activities, such 
as small scrub-clearing Þ res or gathering subsistence timber, 
in which they would have previously intervened, to avoid 
further, potentially lethal, violence (for a similar example of 
violence leading to guards turning a blind eye in Uganda, see 
Norgrove and Hulme 2006). Fires to clear scrub are openly 
and frequently set within the village, and subsistence wood 
cutting is done openly in daylight. In more serious incidents, 
such as extensive commercial timber cutting, they call the 
forestry police to intervene, rather than do it themselves. The 
chief guard stated that such tolerance and indirect regulation 
was because they want to avoid situations of conß ict with 
the community. Unlike in La Sal, in El Arroyazo there were 
no social connections between guards and villagers, and so 
the same constraints against resistance were not present. As a 
result, villagers were able to reshape reserve regulations to a 
situation which beneÞ tted them more.
The violent resistance to regulation in the buffer zone meant 
that villagers have won concessions which allowed them to 
continue their agricultural practices. They have moved from 
growing subsistence root crops to the cultivation of ornamental 
ß owers, taking advantage of a unique cool micro-climate which 
allows European ß owers to grow in the Caribbean and good 
transport links to the markets of the large cities. The intense 
nature of growing ß owers provides farmers with sufÞ cient 
income to support themselves from a much smaller plot of 
land than is required to grow sufÞ cient subsistence crops. 
Villagers are clear that ß oriculture allowed the community to 
survive, with one farmer arguing that had they not been able to 
diversify, then the reserve would have Þ nished us like La Sal. 
Villagers sometimes argue that growing ß owers has made El 
Arroyazo slightly wealthier relative to neighbouring villages.
Despite this success in one part of the buffer zone, the core 
area of the reserve remains unchallenged despite long term 
signiÞ cant discontent with its regulations. Villagers had a 
strong sense that their own livelihoods had been signiÞ cantly 
affected by the reserve, and that as such, it had a long standing 
but unfulÞ lled moral obligation to compensate them, although 
the reserve guards counter this by arguing that as villagers 
were damaging the forest, they do not deserve compensation. 
The villagers sense of a moral debt has weakened slightly 
since ß oriculture emerged as a viable alternative livelihood 
to subsistence farmingas one male vegetable farmer stated, 
they have forgotten how much we depended on the forest, 
but the desire to reclaim it remains strong. Many argue that 
the reserve conspires against peasants and their livelihoodsa 
typical statement was our parents founded this community, 
we grew up here and they [the reserve] want to throw us out 
(teenage ß ower cultivator). They consistently state that they 
would like the reserve to disappear so they could reclaim forest 
resourcesif it could go away tomorrow, the people would 
want that (male wage labourer). Yet no actions are taken to 
reclaim the reserve as they were taken to limit regulation in 
the buffer zone. Villagers state that there is no point in even 
contemplating a challenge because the reserve, like other 
projects implemented by the state or powerful corporations, is 
indefatigable, far more powerful and permanent than the weak 
peasantry. One housewife argued that the government can do 
what it likes and the peasant doesnt matter, and a male ß ower 
cultivator stated the big dog always eats the small dog. When 
asked why villagers did not try to reclaim resources lost to the 
reserve, one housewife lamented rhetorically Imagine, what 
can you do with an organisation like that? The difference 
in power meant that resistance to the core reserve area is not 
even considered.
The reserve authorities project an illusionary picture for 
the governments and funding bodies such as international 
development and environmental NGOs that they provide 
economic assistance to villagers, that villagers participate 
widely in the reserve management, and that villagers approve 
of the reserves activities. This reß ects the villagers isolation 
from means of power. Firstly, the literature produced by the 
reserve authorities for government and funders details extensive 
assistance and participation, yet locals strongly and angrily 
deny these occurred. Secondly, meetings are stage-managed to 
maintain such an illusion. For example, having worked without 
a formal management plan for nearly two decades, the NGO 
running the reserve was forced by the government to develop 
one in 2007. Government guidelines require local participation 
when writing management plans, and an external consultant was 
brought in to run a workshop in April 2007. Participants were 
invited by the reserve authorities, who selected 15 women and 
3 men from 4 villages in the region, including 3 women and 
1 man from El Arroyazo. This is signiÞ cant as women almost 
exclusively do domestic work rather than farming, and are much 
less likely to highlight the livelihood impacts of the reserve. 
Consequently, aided by signiÞ cant guidance of the debate by 
the reserve authorities, the discussion on environmental issues 
focused on the lack of adequate latrines rather than farming 
or resource issues, and the costs of the reserve were not 
discussed. Furthermore, as the reserve director explained, only 
those local residents who were open minded leaders were 
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invited, meaning ones who could be relied on to support the 
reserve, rather than those who were closed minded, who dont 
understand the issues, and so the opinions of the vast majority 
of residents who opposed the reserve were excluded. The voices 
of local people were prevented from reaching the arenas in 
governments and donor organisations from where the reserve 
draws its inß uence, Þ nance, and power, even as an illusion of 
participation was constructed. There was no opportunity to 
present a counter-narrative about what participation and outreach 
had taken place, nor to have an input into reserve strategies. 
By contrast, the NGO are well connected, and can easily reach 
arenas of political decision-makingas the head guard stated 
[our directors] can phone up the [presidential] palace if they 
need to. This was a signiÞ cant barrier to the villagers being 
able to challenge and reshape the reserve as an institution, or 
to change its policies.
At present, there is a stalemate in El Arroyazo, where the 
memory of the near-fatal violence prevents the reserve from 
intervening too much in activities in the buffer zone, and the 
inconceivability of contesting the reserve means it remains 
unchallenged by locals. Overall, while local people have been 
able to win concessions from the reserve in getting a blind 
eye turned to some activities in the buffer zone around El 
Arroyazo, the reserve has been a success despite sustained 
local opposition. Like other instances of weapons of the weak, 
resistance was enough to limit certain policies, but it was 
unable to seriously challenge the existence of the protected 
area. The reserve still exists as a strong institution, it can 
easily impose its regulations on the core reserve area and the 
buffer zone around La Sal, and the reserve authorities state 
that biodiversity and endangered species are increasing in 
number inside the reserve. Indeed, Ebano Verde scientiÞ c 
reserve has been considered by a consultant report as the most 
successful protected area in the country (ABT Associates 
2002). While the reserve caused considerable hardship 
and sustained resentment amongst local people, they were 
largely prevented from challenging the reserve and altering 
its policies by memories of state violence, lack of time 
and opportunities to coordinate action against the reserve, 
social links to guards and cultural norms of behaviour, and 
the inability to reach important decision-making arenas. 
Indeed, while the reserve remains more than two decades 
after its creation, one of the two villages on its periphery has 
been abandoned as a result of the reserves policies and the 
villagers inability to challenge them. The case demonstrates 
that local support is not essential for the success of protected 
areas, that protected areas can survive and thrive despite long 
term sustained opposition to protected areas because there are 
often a variety of factors which limit local peoples ability 
to shape protected areas.
CONCLUSION
The idea that local support is essential for the success of 
a protected area is a widely held and powerful notion in 
conservation. It has had an impact on protected area policies 
and strategies. While there is some evidence to support it, 
as there are cases where local opposition can be shown to 
have undermined conservation efforts, arguing that local 
support is essential to the success of protected areas is 
simplistic. There are numerous counter-examples where 
sustained local opposition to protected areas has had minimal 
impact. Protected areas can surviveindeed thrivedespite 
long term opposition and local discontent. In an era where 
conservationists are increasingly concerned about the positive 
and negative impacts of their policies on the rural poor, this 
is ethically troubling, as it implies that protected areas do not 
need to consider the well-being of local people as a key factor 
in contributing to successful conservation (Brockington 2004).
What the social science literature on protected areas, and 
the case study discussed here, show is that what needs to be 
analysed are the factors which might empower or weaken local 
people, and either give them or remove from them the ability to 
shape protected areas. These can come from a variety of very 
different sources, from the structure of national civil society 
to community level social norms, and involve very different 
forms of power, from violence to discursive. Through this, 
we would get a much better idea of the relationship between 
protected area success and local support, and the dynamics of 
how local people can inß uence their experience of the costs 
and beneÞ ts of protected areas.
A critical view of the relationship between conservation 
success and local support is necessary in the context of 
changing governance of natural resources and biodiversity. One 
trend is the increased devolution of control of natural resources 
away from states to communities and local organisations 
(Agrawal et al. 2008). At the same time, protected areas may 
increasingly be turning to market mechanisms and putting 
a Þ nancial value on nature as a way of saving it (Igoe and 
Brockington 2007). New mechanisms and processes such as 
payments for REDD and other ecosystem services are being 
created and rolled out. Each of these trends will involve new 
forces aimed at changing the behaviour of people living in and 
around the protected bits of nature, and these forces will enable 
and constrain local peoples ability to shape conservation to 
their liking. For example, market-based conservation puts 
monetary exchange and economic incentives at the centre 
of changing the behaviour of various groups of people. 
Market-based conservation therefore involves different kinds 
of power relations compared to other conservation models 
which have a lesser role for the market, and consequently, 
different forces shaping local peoples behaviour and the 
possibilities they have for political action. When developing 
and designing such conservation projects, there is a strong 
need to consider the implications of local peoples power to 
undermine conservation, to ensure it is equitable and fair, and 
to move towards solutions which are beneÞ cial to both the 
environment and the local people.
Note
1. Fences and Þ nes and community-based conservation are two crude 
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caricatures of policy positions on the extent to which local communities 
should be involved in protected area management and the extent to 
which protected areas should form part of local economies. The former 
emphasises distance between the two, and is most associated with 
early paradigms in protected areas, although it might be resurgent, and 
the latter emphasises local involvement and integration into protected 
areas, and emerged in the 1980s (see Hutton et al. 2005, for a summary 
of the evolution of these ideas). The two positions are considerably 
heterogeneous, and individual protected areas may not Þ t easily into 
either position.
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